Abstract-Publicly accessible data warehouses are an indispensable resource for data analysis. However, they also pose a significant risk to the privacy of the clients, since a data warehouse operator may follow the client's queries and infer what the client is interested in. Private information retrieval (PIR) techniques allow the client to retrieve a cell from a data warehouse without revealing to the operator which cell is retrieved and, therefore, protects the privacy of the client's queries. However, PIR cannot be used to hide online analytical processing (OLAP) operations performed by the client, which may disclose the client's interest. This paper presents a solution for private cell retrieval from a data warehouse on the basis of the Paillier cryptosystem. By our solution, the client can privately perform OLAP operations on the data warehouse and retrieve one (or more) cell without revealing any information about which cell is selected. In addition, we propose a solution for private block download on the basis of the Paillier cryptosystem. Our private block download allows the client to download an encrypted block from a data warehouse without revealing which block in a cloaking region is downloaded and improves the feasibility of our private cell retrieval. Our solutions ensure both the server's privacy and the client's privacy. Our experiments have shown that our solutions are practical.
I. INTRODUCTION

D
ATA warehousing provides tools for business executives to systematically organise, understand, and use their data to make strategic decisions. A large number of organizations have found that data warehouses are valuable in today's competitive, fast-evolving world. In the last several years, many firms have spent millions of dollars in building enterprisewide data warehouses. With competition mounting in every industry, a data warehouse is the latest must-have marketing weapon -a way to allow customers to learn more about their needs [24] .
A data warehouse is a subject-oriented, integrated, time-variant and non-volatile collection of data that supports management's decision making processes [25] . Data warehouses are built on a multidimensional data model. March 29, 2016 . The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Prof. Wanlei Zhou.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS.2016.2527620 This model views data in the form of a data cube. A data cube, defined by dimensions and measures, allows data to be viewed in multiple dimensions. In general, dimensions are the entities with respect to which we want to keep records. For example, a sales data warehouse may keep records of the store's sales with respect to time, location, and product dimensions. Measures are the quantities by which we want to analyse relationships between dimensions. Examples of measures for a sales data warehouse include the sales amount, the number of units sold, and the average sales amount. An example is the sales data organized with respect to three dimensions -time, products, and locations. In the multidimensional model, data is organised into multiple dimensions, where each dimension has multiplelevels of abstraction defined by a concept hierarchy. A concept hierarchy defines a sequence of mappings from a set of lowlevel concepts to high-level, more general concepts. A concept hierarchy for locations could be street, city, state, and country. This organisation provides clients with the flexibility to view data from different perspectives. A number of online analytical processing (OLAP) operations exist to materialise these different views, supporting interactive querying and analysis of the data at hand. Typical OLAP operations include: roll-up -aggregation by climbing up a concept hierarchy; drill-down -the reverse of roll-up; slice -a selection on one dimension, resulting in a sub-cube; dice -a selection on two or more dimensions, resulting in a sub-cube; pivot -rotating the data axes in view in order to provide an alternative presentation of the data.
Queries to the data warehouse are based on a star-net model, which consists of radial lines emanating from a central point, where each line represents a concept hierarchy of a dimension. These represent the granularities available for use by OLAP operations such as drill-down and roll-up. A star-net query model for a sales data warehouse is shown in Fig. 1 , where each circle is called a footprint.
Data warehousing is often built on the client/server model, where a data warehouse server provides data query services to clients. A client may perform certain OLAP operations on the data warehouse with the help of the server before retrieving 1556-6013 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
one or more cells (measures) from the data warehouse at the server. Examples of data warehouses in the client/server model are a stock exchange data warehouse and a pharmaceutical data warehouse. There are two privacy issues with data warehouse queries. One privacy issue is the client's privacy. In order to query the data warehouse, a user usually requests the server to perform OLAP operations and send back a cell. An important issue in this simple process is represented by the privacy of the user query as the user query may reveal to the server business sensitive information. For example, for a stock exchange data warehouse, the user may be an investor, who queries the data warehouse for the trend of a certain stock. He may wish to keep private the identity of the stock he is interested in. For a pharmaceutical data warehouse, the user may be a laboratory, which would like to keep private the active principles it wants to use. To protect its privacy, the user accessing a data warehouse may therefore want to perform OLAP operations and retrieve a cell without revealing any information about which cell it is interested in.
A trivial solution to the above private data warehouse query problem is for the user to download the entire data warehouse and then locally perform OLAP operations and retrieve the cell of interest. This solution is not suitable if the owner of the data warehouse wishes to make profit through data warehouse services (for example, a health care data warehouse). Usually, the user is interested in only a part of the data warehouse. Purchasing the entire data warehouse may not be economically viable.
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocols, such as [14] and [29] , do not fully address the private data warehouse query problem. A PIR protocol allows a user to retrieve a record from a database without the owner of that database being able to determine which record was selected with communication cost less than the database size. By using PIR, a user can retrieve a cell (a record) from a data warehouse (a database) without revealing any information about which cell is retrieved. However, the user cannot hide his OLAP operations to the server when he requests the server to perform the operations. These operations may reveal the user's interest. For example, when the user requests the server to perform a slice operation with respect to a location, the server can learn the user's interest in the location. It is a challenge to assure the user's privacy when performing OLAP operations.
Another privacy issue with data warehouse queries is the server's privacy. Usually, a data warehouse is built for certain business purposes and the owner of data warehouse (server) wishes to make profit by offering data warehouse query services, such as one query per pay. The server has to disclose some data to the client when the client queries the data warehouse, but the server wants to keep the rest of the data private. The service's privacy was called the server's security in [49] . Security of a database server usually refers to securing network against hackers. To avoid confusion, we use the server's privacy term.
To achieve data privacy, data encryption is necessary. Encryption schemes are classified into either secret key cryptosystsm, like DES and AES, or public key cryptosystem, like RSA [42] and Paillier [40] . Public key encryption is less efficient than secret key encryption and often used to protect encryption key for secret key cryptosystems. With the rapid development of computing technologies, the performance of public key encryption has been greatly improved. In recent years, public key cryptosystems have been used to support keyword searches on encrypted data without requiring the party hosting the data to decrypt the data [10] . In addition, public key cryptosystems have been used for attribute-based encryption [23] , [44] , [47] . In attribute-based encryption, all data are encrypted on the basis of some attribute-based access control policies and one can decrypt an encrypted data only if he meets the attribute conditions in the policies. In this paper, we thus consider data encryption with a public key cryptosystem.
In this paper, we focus on the protection of the privacy of the client's queries against the server and on the release to the client of only one cell per query. We do not consider the inference attacks by which a malicious user attempts to infer the individual data through aggregation queries [33] , [46] . Since the server cannot see the real queries from the client, it cannot detect inference attacks. Therefore, we assume that the data warehouse does not contain any information which may lead to privacy breach. The client is able to purchase any cell of the data warehouse. The server provides the client with true data.
In our previous work [49] , we gave a solution for private data warehouse queries on the basis of Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN) [9] cryptosystem. Our basic idea is to allow the data warehouse owner to encrypt all measures but not dimensions in its data warehouse and distribute the encrypted data warehouse to the user who wishes to perform private data warehouse queries. The user can perform any OLAP operations on the encrypted data warehouse locally without revealing his interest. When the user wishes to decrypt a cell of the encrypted data warehouse, the user and the server run a Private Cell Retrieval (PCR) protocol jointly to decrypt the cell without revealing to the server which cell is retrieved.
Unlike operational databases, a data warehouse is non-volatile. The data in the data warehouse is never over-written or deleted -once committed; the data is static, read-only, and retained for future reporting. It is feasible to allow the data warehouse owner to distribute the encrypted data warehouse to potential users only once and let the users download new added data online if any.
Assume that the server charges the client per query, our solution based on the BGN cryptosystem [49] allows the user to perform some statistical analysis, such as regression and variance analysis, on the encrypted data warehouse with the lowest cost. The reason is that the BGN cryptosystem allows one to evaluate multi-variate polynomials of total degree 2 on encrypted values. However, the BGN cryptosystem can be used to encrypt small numbers only. It needs relatively long time to decrypt a ciphertext, when the ciphetext is the encryption of a large plaintext.
To address this problem, we give a solution for private cell retrieval from a data warehouse on the basis of the Paillier public key cryptosystem [40] in this paper. This solution is much faster than our solution based on the BGN cryptosystem.
To improve the performance, our solution now treats all measures in each cell of a data warehouse as one single plaintext and does one encryption per cell instead of multiple encryptions. In this way, we can reduce the size of the encrypted data warehouse by t times when there are t measures in total in each cell. To supplement to our PCR protocol by which the client is provided with the entire encrypted data warehouse before generating private queries, we also give an approach for private block download (PBD) on the basis of the Paillier cryptosystem [40] . Our PBD protocol allows a client to download a block from the encrypted data warehouse without revealing which block in a cloaking region is downloaded. If the client cannot get the entire encrypted data warehouse and he is interested in only one block of the data warehouse, he can download the block from the server with our PBD protocol and then retrieve cells from the block with our PCR protocol. In this way, our PBD protocol can improve the feasibility of our private data warehouse queries. Our PBD protocol can be used to perform dice or slice operation on the encrypted data warehouse at the server side without revealing to the server which block in a cloaking region is retrieved.
Our solutions ensures both the server's privacy in the sense that the server, for billing purpose, releases to the user only data paid by the user, and the client's privacy in the sense that the client does not reveal any information about his queries to the server. We have implemented our solution on an example of data warehouse and experiments have shown that our solution is practical for private data warehouse queries. This paper extends our previous paper [49] by including a new PCR protocol based on the Paillier cryptosystem to improve the performance and a new PBD protocol to reduce the size of the encrypted data warehouse that the client has to download. This is a significant extension that enhances the flexibility and efficiency of our approach. In this paper we also analyze the security and complexity of such protocols. The combination of our PBD and PCR protocol has comparable performance against existing PIR protocols. Furthermore, we model multiple queries with both our PCR and PBD protocols and analyze the client's privacy with respect to multiple queries.
Our solutions for private data warehouse queries can be adapted to the cloud computing environment, where the data warehouse owner outsources the encrypted data cube to the cloud and the outsourced cloud server provides the private block download service to the client. The cloud server does not know the decryption key of the data warehouse owner and thus the privacy of the data warehouse is preserved. The data warehouse owner is needed only when the client wants to decrypt a ciphertext through our private cell retrieval protocol. As shown in our performance analysis, our private cell retrieval can be done efficiently.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related work is surveyed in Section II. We define our model and described our solution in Sections III and IV. The security and performance analysis is carried out in Sections V and VI.
Experimental results are reported in Section VII. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.
II. RELATED WORK In this section, we survey techniques related to protection of the server's privacy and the client's privacy in data warehouse queries.
A. Query Restriction and Data Perturbation
The techniques for preserving server's privacy while answering OLAP queries can be classified into query restriction and data perturbation.
1) Query Restriction: OLAP heavily depends on aggregations such as SUMs, MAXs and so on. These aggregations hide insignificant details of data and hence accentuate general patterns. However, aggregations do not completely remove sensitive information. The remaining information, together with external knowledge, makes malicious inferences possible. As a simple example, Bob can infer the amount of Alice's commission from the amount of their total commission, with the external knowledge of his own commission. Access control cannot prevent this inference attack, as the total salary is a seemingly innocent aggregation.
The simplest form of query restriction is query size restriction. Given a database (or set of rows or records), a query Q(C), where C denotes a condition, is permitted only if the number of records that match C is higher than an integer k. A query size restriction is violated by queries which have considerable overlaps in their query sets. For example, the query sets Male and (Male,CS,2015) overlap significantly, allowing an inference. To address such issue, the query set overlap control is required by which two queries Q(C 1 ) and Q(C 2 ) are permitted only if the difference between the number of records that match C 1 and the number of records that match C 2 is less than an integer r .
In 2004, Wang et al. [46] investigated how to control inferences in data cubes and provided solutions for computing SUM, MAX, and MIN aggregate functions against multidimensional inference attacks. In 2008, Lu and Liu [33] investigated a fundamental problem for inference control in data cubes: how to efficiently compute the lower and upper bounds for each cell value given the aggregations of cell values over multiple dimensions. They provided the first practical solution for estimating exact bounds in two-dimensional irregular data cubes (i.e., certain cell values are known to the attacker), and applied it to privacy protection of released data and fine-grained access control and auditing.
2) Data Perturbation: Query restriction techniques can be costly, especially if an attacker has supplementary knowledge. For larger data cubes, a simpler and more effective technique is to add noise to the statistics generated from the original data. This can be done in two ways. The data in the data cube is modified (perturbed) so as to produce statistics that cannot be used to infer values for individual records; we refer to this as input perturbation. Alternatively, when a statistical query is issued, the system can generate statistics that are modified with respect to those that the original database would provide, again thwarting attempts to gain knowledge of individual records; this is referred to as output perturbation.
The use of perturbation techniques to preserve privacy of individual rows while allowing the computation of data mining models at the aggregate level was proposed by Agrawal and Srikant in 2000 [1] . They used an additive perturbation technique, in which a random perturbation is added to the original value of the row, where the perturbation is picked from another probability distribution function (e.g. Gaussian). They showed that it was possible to build accurate decision tree classification models on the perturbed data.
In 2005, Agrawal et al. [2] proposed data perturbation techniques for privacy-preserving computation of multidimensional aggregates on data partitioned across multiple clients. Data from different clients is perturbed (randomized) in order to preserve privacy before it is integrated at the server. They developed formal notions of privacy obtained from data perturbation and showed that their perturbation techniques provide guarantees against privacy breaches. They developed and analyzed algorithms for reconstructing counts of subcubes over perturbed data. They also evaluated the tradeoff between privacy guarantees and reconstruction accuracy and showed the practicality of their approach.
Query restriction and data perturbation address the server's privacy issues, but cannot protect the privacy of the user query. The user queries may reveal to the server sensitive business information about the user.
B. Private Information Retrieval
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) techniques are commonly used to protect the privacy of the user queries. PIR was firstly introduced by Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz, and Sudan in 1995 [14] . Since then, PIR has been widely investigated. We classify the results as follows [5] , [39] .
1) Information-Theoretic Private Information Retrieval: "Information-theoretic" refers to the fact that the user privacy is assumed to be unbreakable independently from the computational power of a cheater. Chor et al. proved , that any information-theoretic PIR solution has a communication cost with a lower bound equal to the database size [14] . Then they relaxed the problem setting and assumed that there are several (instead of one) database servers, which do not communicate among each other, storing the same data. This assumption makes the non-trivial information-theoretic PIR feasible. The basic idea is to send several queries to several databases. The queries are constructed in such a way so not to give the servers information about the record that the user is interested in. However, using the answers from the queries, the user can construct the desired record. Chor et al. also considered the case when up to t of the servers are allowed to collude against the user.
Ambainis [3] improved the results of Chor et al. [14] , which led to two non-trivial information-theoretic PIR solutions: (1) a k database scheme (i.e., a scheme with k identical databases non-communicating with each other), for any constant k ≥ 2, with communication complexity O(N 1/(2k−1) ); and (2) a (log N) database scheme with communication complexity O(log 2 N · log log N), where N is the size of the database. Further research on information-theoretic PIR appeared in [7] and [26] - [28] .
2) Computational Private Information Retrieval:
In order to get better communication complexity, the computational assumption was weakened by Chor and Gilboa in [13] . "Computational" means that the database servers are presumed to be computationally bounded, i.e., under an appropriate intractability assumption, the database cannot gain information about which data element was selected by the user. For every > 0, Chor and Gilboa presented two computational PIR with complexity O(N ).
In their first paper on PIR [14] they proved that the information-theoretic PIR problem has no non-trivial solutions for the case of a single database. Surprisingly, the substitution of an information-theoretic security with an intractability assumption achieves a non-trivial PIR protocol for single database scheme [29] . Its communication complexity is O(N ) for any > 0. They use an intractability assumption described in [22] . The basic approach is to encrypt a query in such a way that the server still can process it using some special algorithms. However, the server recognizes neither the clear-text query nor the result. The result can be decrypted only by the user. This was the first single-database protocol that considers database privacy. Using another intractability assumption, Cachin et al. [11] demonstrated a single database computational PIR protocol that has poly-logarithmic communication. This is an improvement compared with the polynomial communication complexity of the PIR protocol in [29] . This result looks particularly effective, because the user has to send a minimum log N bits just to address the bit he wants to retrieve in the database. Protocols with better results appeared in [12] , [18] , [31] , and [32] . Recently, Yi et al. [48] proposed a single-database PIR with computational efficiency on the basis of the state of the art fully homomorphic encryption technique [16] , [19] , [43] .
3) Symmetrical Private Information Retrieval: Symmetrical PIR is a PIR problem, where the privacy of the database is considered, i.e., a symmetrical PIR protocol must prevent the user from learning more than one database record of the database during a session. Clearly, symmetrical privacy (database privacy) is a very important property for practical applications, for example for supporting effective billing. A symmetrical PIR protocol for single server was first proposed by Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [30] , and for several servers it was considered by Gentner et al. [20] . Other symmetrical PIR were proposed by Mishra and Sarkar [35] , Naor and Pinkas [36] , [37] .
In addition, Private Block Retrieval (PBR) is a natural extension of PIR in which, instead of retrieving only a single bit, the user retrieves a d-bit block that begins at an index i . PBR techniques are important for making PIR practical. Information-theoretic PBR was introduced by Chor and Gilboa [13] . A practical PBR protocol for a single database was given by Gentry and Ramzan [18] . The security of this scheme is based on a simple variant of the -hiding number-theoretic assumption by Cachin et al. [11] . This scheme has communication complexity O(k + d) only, where k ≥ log N is a security parameter that depends on the database size N and d is the bit-length of the retrieved database block.
With PIR or PBR, a user can retrieve a cell from a data warehouse without revealing any information about which cell is retrieved. However, the user cannot hide his OLAP operations to the server when he requests the server to perform the operations. These operations may reveal the user's interest. In fact, the server can predict the most likely next queries by analyzing past OLAP queries by the user [6] .
III. MODELS FOR PRIVATE DATA WAREHOUSE QUERIES
In this section, we construct two models for private data warehouse queries. One model is for private cell retrieval and the other model is for private block download.
A. Model for Private Cell Retrieval
In this model, we consider a data cube D with d dimensions
where the data cube dimension domain
We assume that the data cube is managed by a server S and used by clients. The server S wishes to make a profit by providing data warehouse services to clients. The clients wish to learn some knowledge from D through OLAP operations on D without revealing their interests to S.
First of all, on input of a security parameter κ, the server S generates its public/private key pair {P K, SK } and encrypts the data cube D into E(D) with the public key P K , where the values of all measure attributes are encrypted, but the values of all dimension attributes are in plaintexts. The encrypted data cube E(D) can be then released to clients.
A client C can either download the encrypted data cube E(D) from the server's web site or request the server to send a CD (Compact Disc) or a DVD (Digital Versatile Disc) of the encrypted data cube by post. This download (transmission) is executed only once because the data warehouse is non-volatile. For new data added into the data cube, we allow the users to download it online. The client can then perform any OLAP operation on the encrypted data cube E(D) locally.
In many cases, the "client" is actually an organization that thus has no problem in downloading and storing the encrypted data warehouse E(D) and performing OLAP operations on E(D).
In order to retrieve a cell from the data cube D after several OLAP operations on E(D) (i.e., to decrypt a ciphertext C from the encrypted data cube E(D) after several OLAP operations on E(D)), the server S and the client C runs a Private Cell Retrieval (PCR) protocol, composed of three algorithms as follows.
(1) Query Generation (QG): Takes as input the public key P K of the server S, the ciphertext C, which is an encryption of either a measure value or a function of several measure values, (the client) outputs a query Q and a secret s, denoted as (Q, s) = QG(C, P K ). (2) Response Generation (RG): Takes as input the query Q and the private key SK of the server S, (the server) outputs a response R, denoted as R = RG(Q, SK ). (3) Response Retrieval (RR): Takes as input the public key P K of the server S, the response R and the secret s of the client, (the client) outputs a plaintext m, denoted as m = RR(R, P K, s). The PCR protocol can be illustrated as in Fig. 2 and is correct if, for any security parameter κ, for any ciphertext C,
holds, where (Q, s) = QG(C, P K ), R = RG(Q, SK ) and Decr ypt denotes the decryption algorithm for the server.
An execution of the PCR protocol is actually a decryption query. The server S can charge the client C per decryption query. The cost for the client to query the data warehouse is linear in the number of decryption queries, that is, the number of the executions of the PCR protocol.
B. Model for Private Block Download
To supplement to our first model where the client is provided with the entire encrypted data warehouse before private queries, we give another model for a client to download a block (sub-cube) from the encrypted data warehouse without revealing to the server which block (sub-cube) in a region is downloaded. This process can be considered as a private slice or dice operation over the encrypted data warehouse at the server side. The purpose of private block download is to avoid downloading the entire data warehouse when the client is interested in only one part of the data warehouse.
We borrow the concept of cloaking region from private location-based queries [21] because our model also deals with private queries. The cloaking region CR is chosen to hide the privacy of the client's interest to some extent.
To download a block B from E(D), a client C chooses a cloaking region CR within E(D) at first. The CR may be the entire E(D) or a part of E(D). The cloaking region CR is composed of n blocks, one of them is the block B and the rest are randomly chosen from E(D) by the client. The n blocks are denoted as B 1 , B 2 , · · · , B n , where
For example, the client C, who is interested in the data for Los Angeles, may choose Los Angeles, San Diego, San Jose, and San Francisco as the cloaking region CR.
We assume that the client C randomly chooses n − 1 blocks with the same dimensions and the same granularities as the block B. For example, if the block B is the data for Los Angeles with two dimensions -years and brands, the client may choose three blocks for San Diego, San Jose, and San Francisco with the same dimensions. The cloaking region is thus composed of the four blocks. Then the client and the server run a Private Block Download (PBD) protocol, composed of three algorithms as follows.
(1) Query Generation (QG): Takes as input the index i of the block B i , the cloaking region CR, the total number n of blocks, the public key P K of the server and the security parameter κ, (the client) generates a public and private key pair ( pk, sk) and outputs a query Q, denoted as (Q, sk) = QG(i, C R, n, P K ), where Q contains the public key pk of the client, CR and n in plaintext. (2) Response Generation (RG): Takes as input the query Q (including the public key pk of the client, and CR and n), (the server) extracts n blocks according to CR and outputs a response R, denoted as
Takes as input the response R and the private key sk of the client C, (the client) outputs a block B i , denoted as B i = RR(R, sk). The PBD protocol can be illustrated as in Fig. 3 and is correct if, for any security parameter κ, for any i , CR and n, we have B i = RR(R, sk), where (Q, sk) = QG(i, C R, n, P K ) and R = RG(Q, P K ).
Because the execution of the PBD protocol consumes computational resources, the server S can charge the client C according to C R and n. The computational complexity of PBD for the server is linear in the size of C R and n, and the communication overhead for the client to download a block is linear in the size of C R/n.
To privately retrieve a cell from the data warehouse, the client C may run a PBD protocol with the server S to download an encrypted block B i which contains the encrypted cell from the encrypted data warehouse E(D) at first and then run a PCR protocol with the server S to decrypt the cell.
The differences between the above two models are as follows:
• In PCR, the client C has been provided the encrypted data warehouse E(D) before private queries. In PBD, the client C does not have E(D) and wishes to download an encrypted block from E(D) without revealing to the server S which block in a cloaking region is downloaded.
• In PCR, the server S generates its response R with its private key SK . In PBD, the server S generates R with the public key pk of the client and therefore the role of the data warehouse server can be played by any server which hosts the encryption of data warehouse, such as a cloud service provider.
• By PCR, the client can get a cell of E(D) decrypted by the server. PBD cannot lead to decryption of any cell in E(D).
C. Privacy Definitions
The privacy of the PCR/PBD protocols involves the server's privacy and the client's privacy. Intuitively, the server S wishes to release only one cell value to the client C each time the client sends a query. Meanwhile, the client C does not wish to reveal to the server which cell or block is retrieved.
Formally, the server's privacy can be defined with a game as follows.
Given a data cube D and the public key P K of the server, consider the following game between an adversary (the client) A, and a challenger C. The game consists of the following steps:
(1) Given the public key P K of the server, the adversary A chooses two different values m 1 , m 2 of either two different cells or the same cell and sends them to C. in an arbitrary non-black-box way, but cannot run the PCR protocol on C b , and finally outputs b ∈ {0, 1}. The adversary wins the game if b = b and loses otherwise. We define the adversary A's advantage in this game to be
where k is the security parameter.
Definition 1 (Server's Privacy Definition):
In the PCR/PBD protocols, the data warehouse server has (semantic) data privacy if for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A, Adv A (k) in the above game is a negligible function, where the probability is taken over coin-tosses of the challenger and the adversary.
Server's privacy ensures that the client cannot distinguish the encryptions of two plaintexts even if the two plaintexts are the same. Without the help of the server, the client cannot decrypt any ciphertext in the encrypted data cube E(D).
Next, we formally define the client's privacy for PCR and PBD protocols in a single query with a game as follows.
Give an encrypted data cube E(D) and the public/private key pair (P K, SK ) of the server, as well as the cloaking region CR and the number n of blocks in the case of PBD, consider the following game between an adversary (the server) A, and a challenger C. The game consists of the following steps:
(1) The adversary A chooses two different ciphertexts C 0 and C 1 (in the case of PCR) or two different blocks B 0 and B 1 of n blocks with the same dimensions within a cloaking region CR (in the case of PBR), and then sends them to the challenger C. (2) The challenger C chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and executes the Query Generation (QG) to obtain The adversary wins the game if b = b and loses otherwise. We define the adversary A's advantage in this game to be
Definition 2 (Client's Privacy Definition for Single Query):
In the PCR or PBD protocol, the client has (semantic) query privacy if for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A, Adv A (k) in the above game is a negligible function, where the probability is taken over coin-tosses of the challenger and the adversary.
Client's privacy ensures that the server cannot tell which information the client has retrieved from the data cube E(D) in the PCR protocol and which block in CR the client wants to download in the PBD protocol.
At last, we formally define the client's privacy for PCR and PBD protocols in multiple queries with a game as follows.
Give an encrypted data cube E(D) and the public/private key pair (P K, SK ) of the server, consider the following game between an adversary (the server) A, and a challenger C. The game consists of the following steps:
( 
Definition 3 (Client's Privacy Definition for Multiple Queries):
In multiple queries with the PCR/PBD protocols, the client has (semantic) query privacy if for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A, Adv A (k) in the above game is a negligible function, where the probability is taken over coin-tosses of the challenger and the adversary.
IV. PRIVATE DATA WAREHOUSE QUERIES
In this section, we construct a private cell retrieval (PCR) protocol according to our PCR model and a private block download (PBD) protocol according to our PBD model. Then we describe how to perform private OLAP operations over the encrypted data warehouse.
A. Initialization
Before releasing the data cube to clients, the server S runs an initialization algorithm to encrypt the data cube.
We consider a data cube
We assume that
The server S randomly chooses two large primes p, q on the basis of a security parameter κ, lets N = pq, the public key P K = {g, N} and the private key SK = {p, q}, where g is chosen from Z N 2 and its order is a nonzero multiple of N. Assume that log 2 N > tα.
Next, the server S runs the following initialization algorithm to encrypt the data cube D to E(D).
and add (z) Remark: In the case in which the data for a cell in data warehouse is not available, we leave the whole cell as empty without any encryption. In the case in which some measure in a cell is not available, we let it be zero and encrypt all measures in the cell into one ciphertext.
After that, a client C can either download the encrypted data cube E(D) from the server's web site or request the server to send a CD/DVD of the encrypted data cube by post.
B. Paillier-Based Private Cell Retrieval Protocol
Based on our PCR model, we give a new construction of PCR protocol based on the Paillier cryptosystem [40] . Given the encrypted data cube E(D), if a client C wishes to retrieve a cell, in other words, to decrypt a ciphertext C in a cell, the client C and the server S run our Private Cell Retrieval protocol, composed of three algorithms, Query Generation (QG), Response Generation (RG), and Response Retrieval (RR), as in Algorithms 2-4.
Theorem 1 (Correctness): Our Paillier-based PCR protocol is correct. In other words, for any security parameter κ, for any 
where the decryption algorithm is based on the Paillier cryptosystem [40] .
ciphertext C in a cell, which is an encryption of t measures x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x t , we have
holds, where (Q, s) = QG(C, P K ) and R = RG(Q, SK ). Proof: We assume that C = g x r N (mod N 2 ), where
With reference to Algorithm 3 and [40], we have R = Decr ypt (Q, SK ) = xs(mod N).
From Algorithm 4, we have
Since log 2 N > tα and log 2 x < tα, we have m = x and
Assume that
Algorithm 5 PBD Query Generation (Client) Input: i, C R, n, P K (the public key of the server S) Output: Q, sk 1: Randomly choose two large primes p, q on the basis of a security parameter κ and P K , such that the size of N = pq is larger than the size of the ciphertext in E(D). 2: Let sk = {p, q} and pk = {g, N}, where g is chosen from
Z N 2 and its order is a nonzero multiple of N. 3: For each j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} 4: { Pick a random integer r j ∈ Z * N 2 , compute N 2 ) otherwise where the encryption algorithm is based on the Paillier cryptosystem [40] . 5 : } //End of For 6: Let Q = {C R, n, z 1 , z 2 , · · · , z n , pk}, sk = {p, q}.
7: return Q, sk
In the same way, we can prove that m i+1 = x i+1 , · · · , x t = m t . Therefore, RR(R, P K, s) = (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x t ) and the theorem is proved.
Our Paillier-based PCR protocol does not require the client to compute the discrete logarithm in the response retrieval and thus is more efficient than our BGN-based PCR protocol in [49] .
C. Private Block Download Protocol
Based on our PBD model, we give a construction of the PBD protocol which allows the client to download a block from the encrypted data warehouse without revealing to the server which block in a cloaking region is downloaded.
Our PBD protocol is built on the Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme [40] . It is needed only when the encrypted data warehouse is huge and it is hard for the client to download and store the entire encrypted data warehouse.
Before the client and the server run our PBD protocol, the client may request the server to perform certain OLAP operations, such as roll-up or drill-down, without revealing the actual query of the client. Suppose that the client wants to download a block B from the encrypted data warehouse E(D). He randomly chooses n − 1 blocks with the same dimensions as B and the n blocks B 1 , B 2 , · · · , B n (where B i = B and 1 ≤ i ≤ n) form a cloaking region CR.
Without loss of generality, we assume that each block B i contains m cells, i.e., m ciphertexts C i1 , C i2 , · · · , C im , in a order.
Remark: In the case in which a cell in a block B i is empty, we assign an encryption of 0 to the cell. In addition, the client may choose a cloaking region at first and then equally divide it into n blocks.
To download the block B i from the n blocks, the client C runs our PBD protocol with the server S, composed of three algorithms, Query Generation (QG), Response Generation (RG), and Response Retrieval (RR), as described in Algorithms 5-7.
Based on CR and n in Q, extract the n blocks B 1 , B 2 , · · · , B n with the same dimensions, where
where the modular arithmetic mod N 2 is applied to each component. 4 
Decr ypt Theorem 2 (Correctness): Our PBD protocol is correct. In other words, for any cloaking region CR, the number n of blocks, the index i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), and the public key P K , we have B i = RR(R, sk) holds, where
Proof: According to Algorithm 7, we have that
To prove the theorem, we only need to prove that C i1 = Decr ypt (C 1 , sk) . According to Algorithms 5-7, we can obtain
Because a Paillier encryption of m is g m r N (mod N 2 ), we can see that C 1 is an encryption of C i1 , i.e.,
In the same way, we can prove that C i j = Decr ypt (C j , sk) for j = 2, 3, · · · , m and then B i = RR(R, sk). Therefore, the theorem is proved. In our PBD protocol, the server S can charge the client C according to the size of CR and n. The cost for the client to download the block is linear in the size of C R/n.
Our construction is similar to that of Chang [12] and Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [30] . The construction by Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [30] is based upon the cryptosystem by Goldwasser and Micali [22] , which is homomorphic over the group Z 2 , having ciphertext group Z N for a large composite N. The approach by Chang [12] is also based upon the Paillier cryptosystem [40] . The difference is that our construction aims to download a block while their construction aims to retrieve a single data element only.
Like the construction by Chang [12] , the client may partition CR into n blocks according to the dimensions of the data warehouse, such that n = n 1 n 2 · · · n d , where n i is the total number of values of the ith dimension and d is the total number of the dimensions of CR. For the dimension with n i different values, the client runs Algorithm 1 to generate a sub-
where only the ciphertext corresponding to the block of interest is the encryption of 1 and
to the server, which runs Algorithm 6 in series for all subqueries to generate a response. In the end, the client decrypts the response to obtain the block of interest from the encrypted data warehouse. For details, please refer to [12] .
D. Private OLAP Operations
Typical OLAP operations include roll-up (performing aggregation by climbing up a concept hierarchy), drill-down (the reverse of roll-up), slice (performing a selection on one dimension, resulting in a sub-cube), dice (performing a selection on two or more dimensions, resulting in a sub-cube), and pivot (rotating the data axes in view in order to provide an alternative presentation of the data).
For private OLAP operations, we consider two cases: Case 1 -the client C has not been provided the encrypted data warehouse E(D); Case 2 -the client C has been provided the encrypted data warehouse E(D) or has downloaded an encrypted block B i from the server S.
In Case 1, the client C may request the server S to perform some OLAP operations which are not sensitive to the privacy of queries. For example, roll-up from months to quarters along the time dimension, drill-down from states to cities along to the location dimension, and pivot the time and the location dimensions. For slice and dice operations which are most sensitive to the privacy of queries, the client C may run our PBD protocol to download a slice or a dice of the encrypted data warehouse E(D) from the server S.
In Our roll-up operation on E(D) climbing the jth dimension from a concept {a 11 , a 12 , · · · } to a higher concept {A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A ρ } is described in Algorithm 8. 
Proof: According to Algorithm 8, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ, we have
Due to the additive homomorphic property of the Paillier cryptosystems, we have that
Therefore, the theorem is proved.
x ikγ < 2 α and the roll-up operation aggregates all measures correctly.
If the client runs our PCR protocol to decrypt the roll-up results, he may randomly add some fake queries to hide the real dimension of the data of interest to him.
When the client C has downloaded an encrypted block (or sub-cube) B i of E(D), it can perform the roll-up operation on B i in the same way as described in Algorithm 8. We only need to change E(D) to B i .
Finally, drill-down is the reverse of roll-up. It can be implemented by roll-up from the base of the encrypted data warehouse E(D) to any footprint.
E. Private PBD/OLAP/PCR Protocol
Our private PBD, OLAP and PCR protocols described above can be combined in various ways by the client to gain information from the data warehouse without revealing the client's queries to the server. A typical example of such a combination is described as follow.
1) The client runs our PBD protocol with the server to download a part of the encrypted data warehouse from the server without revealing to the server what part in a cloaking region is selected.
2) The client runs our OLAP protocol on the encrypted sub-cube.
3) The client runs our PCR protocol with the server to retrieve one or more cells without revealing to the server what cell is selected.
V. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
A. Privacy Analysis for Server
In this section, we analyze the server's privacy as defined in Section III-C.
In our PCR/PBD protocols, the server uses the Paillier cryptosystem to encrypt each cell of data warehouse before releasing it to the client. The Paillier cryptosystem provides semantic security against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). The ability to successfully distinguish the challenging ciphertexts essentially amounts to the ability to decide composite residuosity. The decisional composite residuosity (DCR) problem can be described as: given a composite integer N and an integer y, decide whether y is N-residue modulo N 2 or not, i.e., whether there exists an integer x such that y = x N (mod N 2 ) .
When N = pq where p, q are distinct large primes, Paillier [40] has shown that the DCR problem is as hard as the integer factorisation problem. Therefore, the DCR problem is believed to be intractable.
Since the definition for the server's privacy is the same as the semantic security of the Paillier scheme, we thus have Theorem 4: Under the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption (i.e., the DCR problem is hard), the data warehouse server has (semantic) data privacy.
B. Privacy Analysis of PCR
In this section, we analyze the security of our Paillier-based PCR protocol in terms of the client's privacy as defined in Section III-C.
Based on the definition of client's privacy, we consider the following game:
(1) Given the public/private key pair (P K, SK ) of the Paillier cryptosystem, the adversary A chooses two different ciphertexts C 1 and C 2 , and then sends them to the challenger C. 
C. Privacy Analysis of PBD
In this section, we analyze the security of our PBD protocol in terms of the client's privacy.
Based on the definition of client's privacy in Section III-C, the challenger C specifies a cloaking region CR with n blocks of the same dimensions from the encrypted data warehouse E(D) and provides the adversary A with CR and n, we consider the following game:
(1) The adversary A chooses two different blocks B 0 and B 1 out of the n blocks and then sends B 0 , B 1 to the challenger C. (2) The challenger C chooses a random b ∈ {0, 1}, and executes the Query Generation (QG) to obtain in an arbitrary non-black-box way, and finally outputs b ∈ {0, 1}. In Step 2, z 1 , z 2 , · · · , z n are encryptions of either 0 or 1 by the Paillier cryptosystem with the public key pk = (g, N) generated by C. If the adversary A can win the game with non-negligible advantage, we can use the adversary A to break the Paillier cryptosystem.
Theorem 6: Under the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption (i.e., the DCR problem is hard), the client has (semantic) query privacy in our PBD protocol.
Proof: Assume that the adversary A can win the game with non-negligible advantage . Now we use the adversary A to break the Paillier cryptosystem.
Suppose that we are given the public key pk = (g, N) of the Paillier cryptosystem, we challenge two plaintexts 0 and 1 and we are randomly given the encryption of either 0 or 1, denoted as β. Given CR and n, we construct the query Q b by letting z i = β and z j = Encr ypt (0, pk) for j = i . When β is the encryption of 1, Q b stands for a real query. In this case, the probability of the adversary A in guessing b correctly is 1/2+ , where is non-negligible. When β is the encryption of 0, Q b contains encryptions of 0s only and is independent of b. In this case, the adversary A can only guess randomly and the probability of the adversary A in guessing b correctly is 1/2. When the adversary A guesses b correctly, we conclude that β is the encryption of 1 and 0 otherwise. In this way, our probability to break the semantic security of the Paillier cryptosystem is 1/2 · 1/2 + 1/2 · (1/2 + ) = 1/2 + /2. In other words, we break the semantic security of the Paillier cryptosystem with a non-negligible advantage.
However, under the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption, the Paillier cryptosystem has semantic security against IND-CPA. Therefore, there does not exist an adversary A who can win the game with non-negligible advantage. Therefore, the client has (semantic) query privacy in our PBD protocol.
Remark: When the CR has n = n 1 n 2 · · · n d blocks and the client wishes to download one block from the CR, the query Q from the client is a sequence of encryptions of either 0 and 1. Following the above proof, we can show that the client has (semantic) query privacy in the PBD protocol with multiple dimensions.
D. Privacy Analysis of Multiple Queries With PBD/PCR
In this section, we analyze the client's privacy when both PBD and PCR are run in succession.
Based on the definition of client's privacy for multiple queries in Section III-C, we consider the following game between an adversary (the server) A and a challenger C as follows.
(1) Give an encrypted data cube E(D) and the public/ private key pair (P K, SK ) of the server, the adversary A chooses two different sequences of ciphertexts or blocks of ciphertexts, A 0,1 , A 0,2 , · · · , A 0, and
where A i, j is either a ciphertext or a block of ciphertexts. When A i, j is a block of ciphertexts, A 0, j and A 1, j are two out of n j blocks of ciphertexts with the same dimensions. Then A sends them to the challenger C. (2) The challenger C chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and executes the Query Generation (QG) on Theorem 7: Under the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption (i.e., the DCR problem is hard), the client has (semantic) query privacy in multiple queries executed according to our PBD/PCR protocol.
Proof: Assume that the adversary A can win the above game with a probability p and the multiple queries are composed of 1 PCR queries and 2 PBD queries. Since all queries look independent to the adversary, the adversary wins the game in two cases -winning the game by querying 1 PCR or winning the game by querying 2 PBD. Assume that the probability of the adversary winning the game by querying a single PCR is p 1 and the probability of the adversary winning the game by querying a single PBD is p 2 , then
If the adversary A can win the above game with a non-negligible advantage = p − 1/2, then either p 1 − 1/2 or p 2 − 1/2 is non-negligible, which is in contradiction with either Theorem 5 or 6. Therefore, the advantage of the adversary in winning the above game is negligible and the theorem is proved.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Performance Analysis of Initialization
Before the client and the server can run any PCR or PBD protocol, the server needs to encrypt the entire data warehouse D by Algorithm 1 and distribute it to the client. The computation complexity in the server is O(|D|). The encryption of the data warehouse can be done in parallel. If the server runs computers in parallel, we can speed up the initialization computation by times. If the client downloads the entire encrypted data warehouse from the server, the communication overhead is O(|D|). This initialization happens only once.
B. Performance Analysis of Paillier-Based PCR
Our Private Cell Retrieval (PCR) protocol is composed of Query Generation, Response Generation, and Response Retrieval.
In the query generation (Algorithm 2), the client generates a query (Q, s) with one exponentiation C s (mod N 2 ) and sends the result to the server.
In the response generation (Algorithm 3), the server receives Q and generates a response R with one modular exponentiation and then returns the result to the client. Note that g λ in the decryption can be pre-computed.
In the response retrieval (Algorithm 4), after receiving R, the client retrieves t measures m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m t of the cell with modular multiplications only.
C. Performance Analysis of PBD
To make our PCR protocol feasible, our PBD protocol allows the client to download a part of the encrypted data warehouse without revealing to the server which part of a cloaking region is downloaded.
In the query generation (Algorithm 5) of our PBD protocol, the client needs to generate a public and private key pair for the Paillier cryptosystem once. The public and private keys can be used repeatedly. Therefore, the public and private key pair can be pre-generated. In addition, the client needs to compute n ciphertexts z 1 , z 2 , · · · , z n under the Paillier cryptosystem for the query Q, where n is the number of blocks in the cloaking region CR. With reference to Algorithm 5, the client needs to compute O(n) modular exponentiations.
In the response generation (Algorithm 6), the server needs to compute O(nm) modular exponentiations, where m is the number of the cells in each block. Note that the computation of modular multiplications can be omitted in comparison to the computation of modular exponentiations.
In the response retrieval (Algorithm 7), the client needs to decrypt m ciphertexts C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C m under the Paillier cryptosystem, which amounts to O(m) modular exponentiations.
In addition, the client sends O(n) ciphertexts to the server while the server sends back O(m) ciphertexts to the client. Therefore, the total communication complexity is O(n) + O(m), which is much less than O(nm) ciphertexts (the size of the cloaking region).
Our PBD protocol is particularly efficient in communication. It needs only (O(n) + O(m))/O(nm) ≈ 1/n communication for the entire CR download. In the case in which n = 100, m = 100, 000 and the ciphertext size is 2,402 bits, our PBD protocol needs 240.44M bits of communications, while the entire CR download needs 24.02G bits of communications. In addition, the client's computation complexity O(n) + O(m) is much less than the server's computation complexity O(nm). In practice, the server has more powerful computation capability than the client. Our PBD protocol reflects this feature. To improve the computational efficiency, the server may run our PBD protocol in parallel on multiple computers because our PBD protocol can support parallel computing. In the case in which there are computers running in parallel in the server, the computation complexity of each computer in the server is O(nm/ ) only.
D. Performance Analysis of Private OLAP
With our PBD protocol, the client can perform private slice and dice at the server side. The computation and communication complexities for our PBD protocol are analyzed in the last section.
The computational complexity for the client to perform slice, dice or pivot operation on the local encrypted data cube is the same as that of the operation on the original data cube. 
E. Comparison
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) requires that the communication complexity be less than the size of the database. We can achieve this by combining our PBD and PCR protocols, i.e., the client runs our PBD protocol to download a block of the encrypted data warehouse from the server at first and then runs our PCR protocol with the server to decrypt a cell of the block.
Assume that the cloaking region CR is the entire data warehouse and has n = n 1 n 2 · · · n d blocks according to the d dimensions of the data warehouse, the performance comparison of our PBD+PCR protocols with existing single database PIR protocols, such as [11] , [12] , [18] , [29] , [36] , and [37] , is shown in Table I . In Table I , m in our protocol is the number of cells in a block. In other protocols, m is 1. From Table I , we can see that the performance of our PBD + PCR protocols are comparable to the performance of other PIR protocols. In particular, our PBD + PCR protocol guarantees both server's privacy and client's privacy, while other PIR protocols guarantee client's privacy only. In addition, the existing PIR solutions cannot guarantee to the client the privacy of OLAP operations.
In Table I , we also compare the performance of our PCR protocols with existing single database SPIR protocols (also known as oblivious transfer (OT) protocols), such as the Naor-Pinkas protocols [36] , [37] . In these protocols, the server encrypts the data (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ) using keys (k 1 , k 2 , · · · , k n ) to get ciphertexts (C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C n ), and sends the ciphertexts to the client. The client and server then engage in an OT protocol, where the client learns a key. The client uses this key to decrypt the data.
Our PCR protocols can support homomorphic additions over the encrypted data. NP protocols [36] , [37] do not have the homomorphic property for their encrypted data. The performance of our Paillier-PCR is independent of the number t of the measures in a cell. However, the performance of our BGN-PCR [49] is linear in t and depends on the size T of the plaintext. Therefore, our Paillier-PCR is much more efficient than our BGN-PCR.
The pre-computation for the server in our protocols is for encryption of the dataset during the initialization. It is done only once and then our protocols can run repeatedly.
When the client has no constraint in communication and storage, he can download from the server the whole cloaking region CR with n encrypted blocks, one of which is the block the client wants to use. Whenever the client wishes to retrieve a cell from the block, he runs the Paillier-based PCR with the server. This is the most efficient solution and privacy of this solution is the same as our PBD and Paillier-based PCR protocols.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the applicability of our private data warehouse queries, we have carried out some experiments based on the TPC-DS standard. 1 This sample database is composed of many multi-dimensional data cubes and each row in a fact table represents one day. We focus on a particular sub-cube, which is centered on a store_sales table.
To reduce the complexity, we limit the dimensions of this cube to date, item, store, and customer, and to ten measures, namely, sales_quantity, wholesale_cost, list_price, sales_price, discount_amt, tax, coupon_amt, net_paid, net_paid_inc_tax, and net_profit.
From the data cube, we extract 5 datasets of increasing sizes: (1) one-year dataset with 531188 rows; (2) two-year dataset with 1056034 rows; (3) three-year dataset with 1590217 rows; (4) four-year dataset with 2117308 rows; (5) five-year dataset with 2647188 rows.
Our experiments have been executed on a desktop machine with a Intel Core i7-2600 processor, which has a clock speed of 3.40GHz, and 16GB of RAM, and we used SQL and the C programming language.
A. Experimental Evaluation With PCR
We have implemented our PCR protocol based on three homomorphic encryption schemes, Paillier [40] , ElGamal [17] and BGN [9] , at the same security level as RSA [42] with 1024-bit modulus.
To implement the BGN-based PCR protocol, we implemented the BGN cryptosystem [9] , in which the elliptic curve structures G, G 1 and associated bilinear pairing e (Type A pairings) are provided by the Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) library. 2 We choose the two primes q 1 and q 2 , each of which has roughly 512 bits in length, so that it is impossible to factorise N according to the current computing technology. Then we generate the public/private key pair (P K, SK ) where P K = {N, G, G 1 , e, g, h, e(g, g) q 1 }, N = q 1 q 2 and SK = {q 1 }.
We encrypt all the measure values in the five datasets by Algorithm 1 with the three homomorphic encryption schemes, respectively, and experimentally evaluate Algorithm 1 assuming that the server runs 20 computers in parallel, α = 64, N has 1024 bits, and compare their performance in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 . Note that the server in our initialization encrypts 10 measures of each cell into one ciphertext in one time, but the server in other two scheme has to encrypt 10 measures of each cell one by one.
From Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 , we can see that the initialization based on the Paillier cryptosystem takes a little bit longer time than that based on the ElGamal cryptosystem, but it requires less space for storing the encrypted measures than the other two cryptosystems, which cannot encrypt all measures in a cell in one time like the Paillier cryptosystem because their plaintext space are small so that the ciphertext can be decrypted by solving the discrete logarithm problem.
Experiment 1 (Private Cell Retrieval): Assumes that the client has a copy of the data warehouse, but all of the cells are encrypted. The client requests the server to decrypt 100, 500, 1000, 1500, 2000 cells, respectively, by running our PCR protocol. Fig. 7 show the total running times and communication overheads of our BGN-based and Paillier-based PCR protocols. Our Paillier-based PCR protocol performs much better than our BGN-based protocol.
B. Experiment Evaluation With Private OLAP
Given an encrypted data warehouse, the slice, dice and pivot OLAP operations can be performed as in the plain data warehouse and the roll-up operation can be performed with Algorithm 8.
Experiment 2 (Private OLAP Operations): Given the encrypted data warehouse, the client performs a dice operation to obtain sales data per day in Store 1 from 1998 to 2002. Based on the encrypted subcube, Store 1, the client further performs a roll-up operation along the date dimension from day to month (i.e., aggregating sales data for each month) with the Algorithm 8, implemented by the C programming language for successively larger datasets (1/1/98-31/12/98, 1/1/1998-31/12/99 and so on). The running times of the roll-up operation using the BGN, Paillier and ElGamal cryptosystems, is illustrated in Fig. 8 .
From Fig. 8 , we can see that the roll-up operation with the Paillier cryptosystem is faster than the roll-up operation with the other two cryptosystems.
C. Experimental Evaluation With PBD
To evaluate the practical applicability of our Private Block Download (PBD) protocol, we implemented the Paillier cryp- tosystem [40] . With reference to [40] , we generate a public/private key pair ( pk, sk) for the client, where pk = {g, N} and sk = {p, q, λ} where λ = lcm( p − 1, q − 1) (i.e., the least common multiple of p −1 and q −1). Based on the setting, we perform an experiment about private slice between the client and the server. Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 , respectively.
Note that the public and private key pair of the Paillier cryptosystem for the client can be pre-generated and reused without any security concerns. In view of this, the running time of our PBD protocol in Fig. 9 is composed of the time for the client to compute n ciphertexts z 1 , z 2 , · · · , z n , where n is the number of blocks in the cloaking region CR, the time for the server to generate the response, and the time for the client to decrypt the response. The main component of the running time is spent by the server to compute the modular exponentiation z C jk j for any C j k in the CR. Since the computations of the exponentiations are independent of each other, the process can be executed in parallel by the server to reduce the response time.
From Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 , we can see that given a CR, the running time and communication overhead of our PBD protocol go down with the increase of the number of blocks.
D. Experimental Evaluation With PBD/OLAP/PCR
In Section IV-E, we combine our PBD, OLAP, and PCR protocols to answer the client's queries. To evaluate the performance, we run (1) PBD as Experiment 3; (2) roll-up operation on the retrieved block from day to month as Experiment 2; (3) PCR to decrypt the block as Experiment 1. The total running times of our PBD/OLAP/PCR protocol with 20 computers running in parallel in the server is reported in Fig. 11 .
Comparing Fig. 11 with Fig. 9 , we can see that the difference of the running time between our PBD and PBD/OLAP/PCR protocols is quite small because OLAP and PCR can be performed very fast.
If we assume that the running time for a client just downloading the plaintext data of 3-year cloaking region from the server and then performing some OLAP operations locally is negligible, our PBD/OLAP/PCR protocol needs at most 70 seconds more, but our client does not have to purchase 3-year plaintext data from the server.
When data transmission is fast, but computation is slow, the client had better download from the server the whole cloaking region CR with n encrypted blocks, one of which is the one the client wants to use. This solution has the same privacy as the PBD protocol, but this solution can significantly improve the efficiency of the private data warehouse queries. In our experiment, downloading the whole cloaking region from the server over a 100Mbps network takes less than 10 seconds.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a new solution, based on the Paillier cryptosystem, for private cell retrieval from a data warehouse after the client gets a copy of the encrypted data warehouse. Our solution allows the client to perform OLAP operations, such as roll-up, drill-down, dice, slice, pivot on the encrypted data warehouse, and then retrieve a cell from the resulting data warehouse without revealing to the server which operations are performed and which cell is retrieved. Our Paillier-based solution is more efficient than our BGN-based solution [49] . Our solution provides not only client's privacy but also server's privacy. Performance analysis and experiments show that our solution is practical for private data warehouse queries.
To enhance our private cell retrieval protocol, we also presented a solution for private block download which allows the client to download a block from the encrypted data warehouse without revealing which block in a cloaking region is downloaded. Our private block download protocol makes our private cell retrieval protocol feasible. The performance of our private block download can be significantly improved with parallel computations. The client can execute our PBD protocol with the server multiple times.
In this paper, we assume that the dimension values do not include sensitive information. In the future, we will investigate whether there exist sensitive dimension values in some applications and how to protect their privacy.
